Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras attempts to explain how there can be becoming while maintaining Parmenides' position that what is, is and for this reason cannot come into being or perish. Like Empedocles, he adopts what one may call a type of Eleatic pluralism. Of all the pre-Socratic philosophers, he comes the closest to positing the existence of a spiritual or immaterial principle, which he calls Nous (Mind), as that which acts upon inert matter.

Anaxagoras was born in Clazomenae in Asia Minor c. 500 BCE; c. 480-79 BCE he came to Athens, where he became the first Athenian philosopher of note. Plato relates that Anaxagoras had a close association with Pericles, the famous Athenian statesman, orator and general: "And that is what Pericles acquired to supplement his inborn capacity. He came across the right sort of man, I fancy, in Anaxagoras, and by enriching himself with high speculation and coming to recognize the nature of wisdom and folly—on which topic Anaxagoras was always discoursing—he drew from that source and applied to the art of rhetoric what was suitable thereto" (Phaedrus, 270a). According to Diogenes, when someone lamented the fact that Anaxagoras would die in a foreign land, he replied, "The descent to Hades is much the same from whatever place we start" (Lives, 2. 11). While in Athens, Anaxagoras was indicted for holding that the sun was actually a mass of red-hot metal, and not a god, presumably, and for treasonable correspondence with Persia; he was condemned to death. Pericles, however, intervened on his behalf and the death sentence was commuted (Lives, 2.12-14).

Diogenes says that Anaxagoras wrote only one one philosophical work (Lives 1. 16), which, unfortunately has not survived except in fragments as quoted by others, in particular, Simplicius. Later writers summarize Anaxagoras' philosophical view, which is useful in interpreting the surviving fragments.

Anaxagoras accepts Parmenides' view that what is, or Being, neither comes into being nor passes out of being. Like Empedocles, he holds that becoming is the result of the combining and separation of imperishable elements. He says in Fr. 17:

The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation. (Fr. 17)

What appears to be the coming into being and passing away of things is really only the mixture and separation of "things that are," the eternal, unchanging elements. Although no statement to this effect is found in the fragments, probably Anaxagoras rejects the idea that nothing can exist, so that there can be no void or empty space.

Unlike Empedocles, Anaxagoras holds that anything whose parts are qualitatively the same as the whole is composed of particles identical to the whole in every way. A piece of gold, a bone, or a stone, for example, consist of imperishable and eternal particles qualitatively identical to the whole. This multitude of basic elements he calls "seeds of all things," because from these everything else is formed. He says, "And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many things and of all sorts in the things that are uniting, seeds of all things, with all sorts of shapes and colors and savors" (Fr. 4). Aristotle explains Anaxagoras' position, "Anaxagoras posits as elements the homoeomeries, i.e., bone, flesh, marrow, and everything else which is such that part and whole are the same in name and nature" (Gen. et corr. 1. 1; 314a 19-21; see also De Caelo 302a 28-302b 9). The "seeds of all things" are synonymous with what Aristotle terms the "homoeomeries," which means "parts that are the same as others." (Whether Anaxagoras used Aristotle's term is unknown.) Diogenes Laertius, echoing Aristotle's description, says, "He took as his principles [archas] the homoeomeries; for just as gold consists of fine particles which are called gold dust, so he held that the All to be compounded of minute bodies having parts homogeneous to themselves" (Lives, 2.8).

Beginning from the Eleatic premise of the impossibility of ultimate becoming, Anaxagoras denies that something can come from something else; one of the "seeds of all things" cannot become another such seed. He asks, "How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh?" (Fr. 10). When hair or flesh grows it must assimilate homogenous particles into itself to increase its mass; it is impossible that the growth of hair and flesh could be the result of the metamorphization and assimilation of other, qualitatively distinct elements.

For Anaxagoras, there are no indivisible particles, no atoms; rather, anything whose parts are qualitatively identical to the whole can be infinitely divided into smaller parts. He writes, "Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being cut" (Fr. 3). That the "seeds of all things" are infinitely divisible follows from the Eleatic premise that what is, is and cannot not be: if one could divide one such seed, so that it ceases to be what it is, because one would eventually reach the component parts (or principles) of the seeds, then one could destroy what is, which, as Parmenides has shown, is impossible. Anaxagoras continues by affirming that the seeds can be infinitely compounded into larger aggregates, which assumes an infinite supply of the "seeds of all things." He says, "But there is also always something greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each thing is both great and small" (Fr. 3) (see Simplicius, Phys., 460.8). The enigmatic statement, "And it [the great] is equal to the small in amount" seems to mean that any "amount" of a type of seed contains an infinite number of parts, since the seeds are infinitely divisible.

Anaxagoras also asserts that there are quantities of everything in everything. Although one type of seed may predominate, thereby determining how something will appear ("But each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it" [Fr. 12]), nevertheless, there is some of every seed in everything. He writes, "In everything there is a portion of everything" (Fr. 11) and "All other things partake in a portion of everything.... for in everything there is a portion of everything" (Fr. 12). This conclusion also follows from the Eleactic premise that becoming is impossible, because becoming presupposes that nothing is and something can cease to be; it certainly is not based on empirical observation. So when something appears to come from nothing what is really happening is that hitherto imperceptible "seeds" of something are coming together to become perceptible. It follows that becoming can only occur if there are quantities of everything in everything or else everthing would simply stay the same. Aristotle sheds some light on Anaxagoras' position:

Do you think that it is methodologically advisable to argue from Eleatic premises, as Anaxagoras does?

Anaxagoras holds that originally there was one infinite, inert Whole in which all particles were so thoroughly blended that it was formless, homogeneous mass. He describes this original state as follows, "All things were together, infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small too was infinite. And, when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished for their smallness" (Fr. 1). He postulates that Nous (Mind) began the process of a separation of these "seeds of all things" and their recombining in disproportionate ratios to become all things. In other words, Mind is the active force in the cosmos. Diogenes says, "He ... was the first who set Nous above matter, for at the beginning of his treatise ... he says, 'All things were together; then came Nous and set them in order'" (Lives 2.6). (According to Diogenes, Anaxagoras thereby picked up the nickname of Nous.)

Anaxagoras discusses Nous in several fragments. In Fr. 13, he says, "And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place from all that was moved, and so much as Nous set in motion was all separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the revolution caused them to be separated much more." Nous set things in motion by causing the original mass to rotate; as it rotated a separation occurred. The largest fragment dealing with Nous is Fr. 12:

All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it.

Because he conceives it as material, however, Anaxagoras falls short of conceiving Nous as a incorporeal or spiritual arche.

In Fr. 14, Anaxagoras says, "And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it and separated off from it." This seems to indicate that, for him, Nous is omnipresent, being everywhere but remaining unmixed with the seeds of all things. But there is a sense in which Nous is present in some things in a way that it is not in others. His statement in Fr. 11, "In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and there are some things in which there is Nous also" should probably be taken to mean that Nous is found in living things as their principle of life; in other words, Nous is soul, although as Aristotle points out Anaxagoras never made this identification explicit:

Similarly also Anaxagoras (and whoever agrees with him in saying that mind set the whole in movement) declares the moving cause of things to be soul. His position must, however, be distinguished from that of Democritus. Democritus roundly identifies soul and mind, for he identifies what appears with what is true-that is why he commends Homer for the phrase 'Hector lay with thought distraught'; he does not employ mind as a special faculty dealing with truth, but identifies soul and mind. What Anaxagoras says about them is more obscure; in many places he tells us that the cause of beauty and order is Nous, elsewhere that it is soul; it is found, he says, in all animals, great and small, high and low, but Nous (in the sense of intelligence) appears not to belong alike to all animals, and indeed not even to all human beings. (On the Soul, 1.2; 404a 25-404b 6)

Later philosophers were somewhat critical that Anaxagoras did not develop his idea of Nous further. Socrates is supposed to have been initially intrigued on hearing about Anaxagoras' doctrine of Nous, but then disappointed when read his book:

Then I heard someone who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which he read that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was quite delighted at the notion of this, which appeared admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if anyone desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or suffering or doing was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, for that the same science comprised both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and then he would further explain the cause and the necessity of this, and would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the center, he would explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied if this were shown to me, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, and how their several affections, active and passive, were all for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was best for all. I had hopes which I would not have sold for much, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse. What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities (Phaedo, 97b-98c)

Socrates expected some sort of teleological explanation from Anaxagoras: if Nous directs all things then surely it does so for the best reasons, so what are those reasons? Anaxagoras introduces the idea of Nous, however, only to explain the beginning of all things, but does use it to explain the nature or purpose of anything. Aristotle makes a similar criticism, "For Anaxagoras makes Nous a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then he drags Nous in, but in all cases ascribes events to anything rather than to Nous" (Metaphysics, 1.4; 985a 18-22). Again, the accusation is that Nous is not really useful as an explanatory principle.